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THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
A LEGAL POSITION PAPER*
INTRODUCTION
We do not need less criticism in time of war, but more. It is to be
hoped that the criticism will be constructive, but better unfair
criticism than autocratic suppression.
-Woodrow Wilson
document is submitted in the spirit expressed above by
THIS
President Wilson. It was prepared in the hope that its presentation might help effect a change in the foreign policy of the
United States in Southeast Asia. It is in a way a dissenting opinion, a rebuttal to the official justifications which have been offered
for President Nixon's recent action in Cambodia and for the
larger United States involvement in VietNam. At a time when
irrationality and heightened emotionalism characterize the foreign
policy debate on both sides, it is imperative that reasonable men
make their voices heard.
The sections which follow deal with the legal questions
arising out of the United States' actions in Southeast Asia.
Though recognizing that many nonlegal factors must be involved
in the determination of foreign policy, we believe that the threshold questions must be legal in nature. This is particularly true
in any society predicated on the rule of law, where official actions,
however wise, can be acceptable only if legally justifiable.
We recognize that any criticism of the Administration's
foreign policy is always susceptible to the retort that those who
criticize lack access to the numerous sources of information which
the President has at his command. This argument, however, if
pressed beyond its reasonable limits, would totally isolate the
President's policies from public debate. When accepted by members of Congress, it becomes particularly dangerous, as it inhibits
the legislative branch from the proper exercise of its constitutional responsibilities. As Congressman Abraham Lincoln observed about another President in another war:

* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Root-Tilden Scholarship
Program by the following students of the New York University School of Law:
Editors: K. Jan Herchold, James W. Jones, Leonard E. Santos, Gordon G. Young;
Associate Editor: John W. Rein; Contributors: Barbara Burnett, Harold Gabriel,
Mark S. Geston, John Grad, Thomas Griffin, Robert W. Mannix, Alson R. Martin,
Michael McKean, Robert McKenna, Richard L. Moe, Thomas K. Monahan, John
J. O'Donnell, Lawrence Pedowitz, Daniel Raas, Albert A. Riederer, Steven A.
Richter and Richard Sherman. The Editors and Contributors concur in the conclusions reached in this document, although not necessarily with every argument that
it presents.
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Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever
he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion and you allow him
to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary
for such purpose-and you allow him to make war at pleasure.
Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect,
after you have given him so much as you propose.1

PART ONE
QUESTIONS UNDER DOMESTIC LAW
I
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CONFLICT

The President may not act unilaterally to initiate or conduct a war. Indeed, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
specifically provides that the power "to declare war" shall rest
with Congress. The initial question in this discussion must thus
be whether the present Southeast Asian conflict amounts to a
"war" in the constitutional sense; if it does not, its conduct may
well be within the executive prerogative.
American courts have traditionally given a broad interpretation to the term "war." The Supreme Court in the Prize Cases2
held that a state of war exists whenever a nation prosecutes its
rights by force. While it is doubtful that any modern court would
employ so sweeping a definition, it is clear that when a given
conflict reaches a certain level of intensity, the constitutional
requirement is satisfied. In 1953 in United States v. Bancrojt,8
the Court of Military Appeals, construing the term "war" as
used in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, stated:
We believe a finding that this is a time of war ... is compelled
by the very nature of the conflict; the manner in which it is carried
on; the movement to, and the presence of large numbers of
American men and women on the battlefields ••• ; the casualties
involved; the sacrifices required; the drafting of recruits to maintain the large number of persons in the military service • • . ; and
the tremendous sums being expended.•..4

Application of these criteria to the Southeast Asian conflict
reveals that it qualifies as a war. Since 1965 over 2,500,000
Americans have served in Southeast Asia. Present troop strength
is reported at 427,000; however, such strength has in the past
been as great as 543,400. Of these, 41,733 have been killed and
1

2
3

4

E. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 451 (1964).
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
Id. at 5, 11 C.M.R. at 5.
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275,724 wounded-more casualties than the United States suffered in World War I. The monetary cost of the war is also
telling. At the beginning of 1969, the Defense Department stated
that the cost of the war was about $28 billion per year. To this
date the war has cost Americans $104.5 billion.5 In 1968 over
50 per cent of the nation's entire airpower was committed to
military activities in Viet Nam.6 In addition, more bomb tonnage
has been dropped in Southeast Asia than was dropped on Ameriica's European enemies during World War IJ.'I' These factors
clearly indicate that the Southeast Asian conflict is in fact a
''war.'' 8
II
LIMITS ON THE PRESIDENT'S POWER AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Having determined that the Southeast Asian conflict is a
war in the constitutional sense, it follows that the President's
power to initiate or conduct military activities is narrowly circumscribed. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 'ZJ. Sawyer, the
Supreme Court in 1952 ruled that there are only two sources of
presidential power-an express grant from the Constitution
itself or a constitutionally valid act of Congress.9 The following
paragraphs will demonstrate that the President lacks authority
to conduct present military operations in Southeast Asia since
the power "to declare war" is expressly entrusted to Congress
and thereby removed from the presidential prerogative. Further,
it will be shown that Congress has not exercised this power
through a delegation to the President or otherwise.

A. President's Military Power Under the Constitution
1. Legislative History
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States," but the legislative history of the Commanderin-Chief clause indicates that the power so delegated to the President was quite limited in scope. The Constitution was written
with the desire to avoid many of the evils of the monarchies of
Europe. The Framers were aware that while kings and princes
5 The figures in this paragraph were supplied by the Department of Defense
in a telephone conversation of May 11, 1970.
6 114 Cong. Rec. 6490 (daily ed. 1968) (remarks of Senator Young).
'1 See note 5 supra.
8 United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 594, 38 C.M.R. 392, 398
(1968) (Ferguson, J., concurring).
9 343 u.s. 579, 585 (1952).
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made wars, it was the people who paid with their money and
lives. Thus, by voice vote the Constitutional Convention refused
a proposal to give the President the power to declare war and
limited his powers instead to those of Commander-in-Chie£.10
These Presidential powers were intended to be substantially less
than those traditionally exercised by the English monarch.
Though the king could declare war and raise and regulate armed
forces, the Constitution reserved these powers in the new republic
to Congress alone. The President's power as Commander-inChief was intended to be nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces as "first
general and admiral of the confederacy.'m The President was
not to be vested with vast war powers which could be exercised
arbitrarily and without authorization.
Another clear expression of the limited extent of the President's power is found in Article I, Section 8, which grants to
Congress the power "to declare war." The original draft of the
Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to "make" war,
but several delegates objected that this terminology might lead
to an interpretation that the President might himself commence
a war. To render such an interpretation impossible, the draft
was amended by substituting the word "declare."12

2. Early Cases
The Supreme Court has upheld the limitations on the President's war power intended by the Framers of the Constitution
in those few cases that have dealt with the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief. In Little v. Barreme/3 the Court held that
the President had exceeded his powers in ordering the Navy to
seize ships coming from French ports, since Congress' consent
to hostilities was limited to ships going to French ports. In
Fleming v. Page,14 the Court, while not expressly deciding the
point, nevertheless addressed itself to the scope of the President's
war-making power. "His duty," wrote the Court, "and his power
are purely military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to
direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by
10 J. Madison, Debates in tbe Federal Convention of 1787, at 418-19 (G. Hunt
& J. Scott eels. 1920).
11 The Federalist No. 69, at 516 (J. Hamilton ed. 1882) (A. Hamilton).
12 2 J. Madison, Journal of tbe Federal Convention 548 (Scott ed. 1893).
See also 2 M. Farrand, The Records of tbe Federal Convention 313, 318-19
(1911).
13 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
14 50 U.S. (9 How.) 602 (1850).
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law at his command ••..m5 In Ex Parte Milligan,1 6 the Court
held that the President's military power to establish military
courts of general jurisdiction could not be exercised in areas
where constitutionally established courts were in operation. In
a concurring opinion Mr. Chief Justice Chase made the following
observation pertaining to the division of military powers between
the executive and legislative branches:
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern
armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide
by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all
legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and
success, except such as interferes with the command of the
fore~ and conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong
to the President as commander-in-chiefP

From the statement of the Chief Justice one can clearly infer
that neither branch may interfere with powers expressly granted
to the other. Thus, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may
not interfere with either the powers of Congress to raise, support
and govern the armed forces or to declare war.
3. History of Executive Actions
Both the legislative history of the Constitution and case
law support the conclusion that the President may not unilaterally
initiate and conduct a war. Indeed, were it not for numerous
instances of the President's unilaterally taking military action,
there would be little question of his inability to do so. In 1966,
however, the Department of State sought, in part, to justify
American involvement in Southeast Asia by citing 125 "similar"
actions in which the President had ordered troops into action or
position without obtaining prior congressional authorization.18
A closer examination of these instances reveals the dangerously
misleading nature of the Department's assertion.
The early history of congressional involvement in military
affairs demonstrates that Congress in no sense abdicated its
constitutional responsibilities. In the so-called "undeclared war"
with France (1798-1800), President Adams felt the need for
congressional authorization to wage what amounted to only a
limited war.10 A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the conId. at 614.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Id. at 139.
Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Legality of the United
States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 565, 579 (1966)
[hereinafter Memorandum].
10 M. Pusey, The Way We Go to War 62 (1969).
11i
16
17
18
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gressional role in Bas v. Tingey 20 where Justice Chase stated:
"Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or Congress
may wage a limited war; limited in place, in object, in time." 21
When President Jefferson took action against the Tripolitan
pirates in December 1801, he instructed the Navy to protect
Americans but nevertheless restrained the United States forces
from any but defensive actions without congressional approval.22
In December 1801 Jefferson went to Congress requesting authority23 to take offensive measures, which was ultimately granted.24
In December 1805 Jefferson, fearing Spain might violate the
Louisiana border, asked Congress for authority to use appropriate
protective force. 211 The Congress thought it unwise, however, and
demurred.26
Even the Monroe Administration, which in 1823 boldly
announced a forceful United States foreign policy, showed deference to the constitutional authority of the Congress. Secretary
of State John Quincy Adams informed the Colombian ambassador that in reference to the use of military force under the
Monroe Doctrine: "[B]y the Constitution of the United States,
the ultimate decision of this question belongs to the Legislative
Department of the Government."27
While there are several instances of the President's sending
United States forces abroad, at no time during these early years
did the President wage a war, limited or otherwise, without the full
consent of Congress. In the nineteenth century there were some
apparent deviations from the policy of congressional participation in military affairs, but in each case Congress vigorously
asserted its prerogative. In May 1846 President Polk unilaterally
undertook military operations against Mexico in response to what
was arguably an invasion of United States territory. On January
3, 1848, the House of Representatives declared that the war was
"unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of
the United States."28 The Congress was similarly outspoken
eight years later when President Pierce authorized United States
20
21
22

4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 36 (1800).

Id. at 43.
1 T. Jefferson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents 327 (J. Richardson ed. 1896).
23 '1 Annals of Congress 19 (1851).
24 Id. at 327-29; 8 Annals of Cong. 1210-25 (1852).
211 ill Abridgement of Debates of Cong. 348-49 (1857).
26 Jefferson, supra note 22, at 389-90.
27 The Record of American Diplomacy 185 (R. Bartlett ed. 1956).
28 E. McCormac, James K. Polk-A Political Biography 530 (1922).
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shelling of Greytown, Nicaragua.29 At the beginning of the twentieth century the President again acknowledged congressional
authority by seeking legislative authorization for military actions
against Spain.30 The pattern of the formative years of the nation's
history is clear-all three branches of government recognized
Congress' sole authority to initiate and conduct war.
In recent years the President has acted more independently
than before in commencing military actions, but the constitutional import of these unilateral uses of force remains unclear.
In the first place, of the numerous instances cited by the Department of State, it is uncertain how many qualify as "wars" in the
constitutional sense. Secondly, assuming arguendo that sufficient number so qualify, it is by no means clear that such
exercises of executive prerogative can operate to expand the
Presidential powers granted by the Constitution.
The o1zly conflict of this century which was arguably instituted by unilateral presidential action and which rivaled the
present Southeast Asian situation in terms of duration, costs and
troop commitment was the Korean conflict. The Korean "police
action," which lasted for some three years, ultimately proved
to be the fourth largest war in the nation's history, costing some
30,000 lives and scores of billions of dollars.81 Moreover, some
members of Congress, regarding the conflict as a "war," had
grave doubts as to its constitutional propriety. Senator Robert
S. Taft of Ohio, for example, stated that by sending American
forces to Korea at his own discretion and without legislative
authorization, the President had "usurped power and violated
the Constitution and laws of the United States.1132
Some constitutional theorists have argued that a history of
unchallenged executive practices can put a "gloss" on the Constitution, i.e., that a history of congressional acquiescence in the
exercise of a power by the President may create the authority
for that exercise where it does not otherwise exist under the
Constitution. The Supreme Court adopted this position in United
States v. :Midwest Oil Co. 88 The Court ruled that the long-continued practice of the President, with the tacit acquiescence of
Congress, of withdrawing certain public lands that would other-

a

20 F. Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President Versus the Constitution,
in The Vietnam War 2nd International Law 24 (R. Falk ed. 1968).
30 31 Cong. Rec. 3699 (1898}.
31 A. Kelley & W. Harbison, The American Constitution 858 (3d ed. 1963).
32 Id.
83 236 u.s. 459 (1915}.
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wise have been open to private acquisition, operated as a grant
of implied power to the President to continue such withdrawals.
As the Midwest Court made clear, the finding of such
implied power depended on the existence of a long-continued
executive practice coupled with congressional acquiescence. But
the proposition that the President acting unilaterally can take
this country to war in the constitutional sense can be justified
if at all, only on the basis of the Korean precedent, an argument
which scarcely demonstrates a long-continued executive practice.
Moreover, assuming that any life remains in the Midwest holding, neither that case nor any other Supreme Court case bas ever
held that an implied grant of power to the President may be
found as a result of congressional acquiescence in the exercise of
a Presidential power expressly granted to Congress by the Constitution. Thus, it is doubtful that even the rationale of the
Midwest case could be applied to executive exercise of Congress'
war power.
Further, the Supreme Court itself in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer 4 has virtually abandoned the :Midwest holding. Ruling that President Truman's seizure of a steel mill without congressional authority could not be justified by virtue of
the fact that previous Presidents bad acted similarly, the Court
observed:
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority
have taken possession of private business enterprises in order to
settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not
thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution "in the Government of the United States, or any Department
or Officer thereof."35

The Court's holding seems eminently reasonable, for otherwise
we are left in the absurd position of affirming the proposition
that the President can increase his power by means themselves
unconstitutional.
4. President's Power to Repel Attack

The Government has argued, quite correctly, that the power
of the President as Commander-in-Chief includes the power to
engage in hostilities, without congressional authorization, in order
to repel armed attack against the country. At the Constitutional
Convention the wording of the provision granting Congress the
34

85

u.s.

343
579 (1952).
Id. at 588-89.
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power to "make" war was changed allowing Congress to "declare" war instead. The reason for the change was, inter alia, to
permit the President to defend against attacks on his own initiative, as Congress might be slow to meet such an emergency.36
This exception to the exclusivity of Congress' power to declare
war is, however, narrowly circumscribed.
As previously observed, in granting the power to initiate
war solely to Congress, it was the Framers' intention that a
decision of such gravity should be made only by the representatives of the people. The emergency power of the President to
repel attack must be construed in light of this primary intent.
While it is perfectly natural that the President was granted
sufficient powers to protect the nation from irreparable harm in
situations where the Congress could not be convened, that power
must be viewed as only temporary. This was clearly the understanding of James Madison, who asserted that Congress retained
most of the war power, thereby allowing the President to repel
attacks but not to commence war.37
Early Presidential actions support Madison's interpretation.
In 1801 President Jefferson, though directing the Navy to take
defensive measures against Tripolitan pirates, sought and received a congressional grant of authority before authorizing
offensive actions.38 In 1805 Jefferson, fearing an attack by Spain
across the Louisiana border, asked Congress for authority to use
appropriate protective force. Although his request was denied,
the fact that Jefferson felt constrained to seek congressional
authorization indicates the narrowness with which he construed
his "defensive" powers.39
B. President's :Military Powers Under Congressional Authority
From the above discussion it is apparent that the President
derives no authority from the Constitution unilaterally to initiate
a war. Such power is vested only in Congress. The question
remains, however, whether Congress may to any extent or under
any circumstances delegate its exclusive military power to the
Chief Executive. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,40 the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress may delegate certain of its powers to
selected agents. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States/1
See Madison, supra note 10, at 418-19.
Id.
See J cfferson, supra note 22 1 at 327.
Id.
293 u.s. 388 (1935).
41 295 u.s. 495 (1935).

30
37
33
30
40
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the Court ruled that any such delegation must be sufficiently
specific as to the nature and scope of the powers authorized and
as to the circumstances in which they may be exercised. The
following discussion will demonstrate that Congress has not delegated authority to the President to make the Cambodian incursion
or to wage the Viet N am war.

III
THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION

We can discern no possible legal justification for the President's actions in Cambodia. Many arguments have been advanced in favor of the legality of American operations in Viet
N am. While we find none of these persuasive (as shall be demonstrated below), they are at least arguable. One searches the
record in vain, however, for any evidence which supports the
constitutionality of the President's actions in Cambodia.
The President, in his speech of April 30, 1970, offered at
most one justification for unilaterally ordering the incursion into
Cambodia-his power as Commander-in-Chie£.42 The President
has no power as Commander-in-Chief to initiate or conduct a
war save in the case of an armed attack. The question thus
arises whether the President's actions in Cambodia were in
response to an armed attack. As will be discussed more fully
later in this paper,48 no military forces were deployed from
Cambodian sanctuaries against troops of either the United States
or South Viet N am in a manner to make executive action imperative without congressional consultation.44 Hence, the narrow
constitutional requirements for unilateral Presidential action were
not satisfied.45
Since the President had no power to initiate the Cambodian
operation unilaterally, his actions can be justified constitutionally
only if undertaken pursuant to congressional authorization. We
are unable to find such a legislative grant, nor has the Government to date suggested one. None of the legal arguments advanced to show congressional authorization for United States
presence in VietNam can be made with regard to our involvement in Cambodia. For example, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution46
in its broadest interpretation cannot be stretched to authorize
42 Address by President Nrxon, April 30, 1970, reprinted in N.Y. Times,
May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
43 See Part Two infra.
44 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
45 See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
46 78 Stat. 384 (1964). See Documentary Supplement infra.
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the present incursion. Even assuming that this resolution authorizes the American presence in VietNam, section 2 seems to limit
our assistance to members or protocol states of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO), a category that does
not include Cambodia.47 Likewise, Congress has neither appropriated funds for military activities in Cambodia nor specifically
authorized troop commitments there. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the only congressional consideration of possible Cambodian activities resulted in opposition to such a commitment
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.48
In view of these conclusions, it is most disturbing that the
President, being the officer of the Government expressly entrusted
with the responsibility to see that the laws of the land are faithfully enforced, should so blatantly ignore his constitutional responsibilities. Such action can only serve to undermine confidence
in the President and to exacerbate the growing disrespect for
law throughout the country.
IV
THE VIET NAM WAR
We need not here repeat the reasons why the present conflict
in VietNam qualifies as a war in the constitutional sense.49 Nor
need we remake the arguments relative to the consequences
resulting from such a characterization, viz., that the President
lacks constitutional power to initiate or conduct a war without
congressional authorization except in an emergency situation in
response to an armed attack. 60
Even conceding that the President's initial exercise of military power in Viet N am might have qualified as an emergency
action, we have seen that the authority created under such excep47 Sept. 8, 1954, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28
(effective Feb. 19, 1955). See Documentary Supplement infra.
48 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1970, at 1, col. 8. It is also appropriate to note
that on June 25, 1969, the Senate by a vote of 70-16 passed the so-called
"National Commitments Resolution." S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
The Resolution was generally hailed as a congressional attempt to reassert its
voice in decisions committing United States forces for use in foreign territories.
It provides:
Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent
years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is
the sell£e of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States
to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative
action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States
Government through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative
instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment.
49 See Section I of this Part supra.
uo See Section II of this Part supra.
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tion expires when it is first possible to place the matter before
Congress.51 The President himself tacitly acknowledged this
limitation in seeking the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution from Congress in August 1964. Since it is impossible to justify our present
military actions in VietNam as a response to an armed attack,
the sole remaining question is whether Congress itself has authorized such actions in any constitutionally permissible manner.
A. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
The executive branch has repeatedly claimed that the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution52 constitutes congressional authorization
for the extensive military operations in Viet N am. Indeed,
Under Secretary of State Katzenbach went so far as to call the
resolution the "functional equivalent" of a congressional declaration of war.53 An examination of the legislative history of the
resolution, however, does not support this conclusion.
Statements made on the floor of Congress and in hearings
before congressional committees indicate the limited nature of
legislative intent with respect to the resolution. Senator
Fulbright, one of the sponsors, indicated that the purpose of
the resolution was "to prevent the spread of war, rather than
to spread it." 54 Further, the message from President Johnson
in support of the congressional authorization stated in part:
"As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no
rashness and seeks no wider war.m5 The executive branch also
promised that Congress would not be ignored after enactment
of the resolution. Secretary of State Rusk declared: "[I]f the
Southeast Asia situation develops . . . there will continue to be
close and continuous consultation between the President and
Congress."56
During the Senate debates Senator Brewster stated that he
"would look with dismay on the landing of large armies on
the continent of Asia," and asked Senator Fulbright if the
resolution would approve "the landing of large American armies
in Vietnam or China."57 Senator Fulbright replied: "There is
See Madison, supra note 10, at 419.
78 Stat. 384 (1964). See Documentary Supplement infra.
Senate Co=. on Foreign Relations, Statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Nat'l Commitments to Foreign Powers, S. Rep. No. 797, 90th Conr;.,
1st Sess. 82 (1967) [hereinafter Nat'l Commitments Hearing].
54 110 Cong. Rec. 18,462 (1964).
55 110 Cong. Rec. 18,132 (1964).
56 Statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Joint Hearing on Southeast
Asia Resolution Before the Senate Co=. on Foreign Relations and the Senate
Co=. on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964).
57 110 Cong. Rec. 18,403 (1964).
til
52
53
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nothing in the Resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. I
agree with the Senator that that is the last thing he would want
to do." 58 In the House Representative Thomas Morgan, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated unequivocally: "The Resolution is definitely not an advance declaration
of war. The committee has been assured by the Secretary of State
that the constitutional power of Congress in this respect will
continue to be scrupulously observed."59 In summary, the legislative history demonstrates beyond doubt that in passing the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Congress did not intend to declare
war or to authorize the sustained, large-scale hostilities which
have resulted.
B. Ratification by Appropriation of Funds
or by Congressional Inaction

Proponents of the Administration's position have argued
that by appropriating funds to support the military in VietNam,
Congress has thereby authorized our participation in the war.
This argument, however, cannot stand under scrutiny.
Whether a Congressman agrees or disagrees with the policy
of the President in Southeast Asia, he can neither morally nor
politically deny weapons, shelter and food to American soldiers
facing daily attack. Congress is forced to appropriate money to
keep American soldiers alive, even if their lives are endangered
solely as a result of executive usurpation of Congress' power to
declare war. This fact has been recognized both by those who
have supported the President's policy and by those who have
opposed it. Senators Richard Russell,60 Sam Ervin/1 Joseph
Clark,62 Peter Dominick,63 Bourke Hickenlooper/4 and Representative Paul Findley65 have all recognized that Congress had
no choice but to protect the lives of soldiers already in the field.
In addition, before passing a Viet N am appropriations bill in
March 1966, numerous Congressmen and Senators indicated that
their votes were not to be interpreted as authorizing large-scale
military escalation. 66
Ratification by appropriation is constitutionally impermisliB
li!l
60
()1

62
63
64

65
66

Id.
100 Cong. Rec. 18,539 (1964).
112 Cong. Rec. 4370, 4372 (1966).
Nat'l Commitments Hearing, supra note 53, at 219-20.
112 Cong. Rec. 4382 (1966).
Nat'l Commitments Hearing, supra note 53 1 at 246.
Id. at 219, 248.
Id. at 235.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
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sible for another reason. In Greene v. McElroy, 67 the Supreme
Court stated that where executive action is of dubious constitutionality, it is not sufficient to argue that Congress has impliedly
ratified the action by appropriating money. Explicit ratification
is necessary to insure "careful and purposeful consideration
by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws.
Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by default to
administrators who, under our system of government, are not
endowed with authority to decide them." 68 Thus, appropriation
of funds to keep American soldiers alive constitutes neither
congressional approval of the President's policy nor, even if
such approval were intended, the necessary explicit ratification
of the President's actions required by the Constitution.69
The above principles apply with even greater force to the
argument that ratification of presidential actions in Viet N am
may be implied from congressional acquiescence. Since the Supreme Court has held that ratification cannot be implied from
the affirmative act of appropriation, a fortiori, congressional
inaction cannot be construed as constituting the necessary ratification. The decision of the Supreme Court in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer10 supports this conclusion. Holding
that Presidential seizure of a steel mill could not be jusified on
grounds that previous Chief Executives had taken similar actions
without congressional approval, the Court concluded that the
failure of Congress to disapprove the former exercises of Presidential power in no way reduced Congress' "exclusive constitutional authority" in the field. 71
PART TWO
QUESTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
I
CAMBODIA

A. Collective Self-Defense Under the
United Nations Charter
The legal justification under international law for the incursion of United States forces into Cambodia was presented in a

u.s. 474 (1959).

67 360
68 Id. at
69
70
71

507.
See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
343 U.S. 579 (1952). See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
343 U.S. at 588.
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letter of May 5, 1970, from the Permanent Representative of
the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Charles
Yost, to the President of the Security CounciF2 The letter
stated that the United States action in Cambodia was taken as
a measure of "collective self-defense.1173 In essence, this same
justification has been employed to explain all United States
military actions in Viet Nam and it forms the foundations of
the March 1966 Department of State Memorandum on the
legality of United States participation in the defense of Viet
Nam.74
It is important, therefore, to consider the meaning of the
concept of "collective self-defense" as embodied in Article 51
of the United Nations Cha.rter.75 Article 51 constitutes an
exception to the basic article 2 ( 4) obligation of members of the
United Nations to "refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force." Article 51 states in part: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a. member of the United N a.tions until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." Military action taken in self-defense which does not
satisfy the article 51 exception results in a prima. facie violation
of the obligations assumed under the Charter. The invocation
of self-defense as the justification for the use of force depends
on the satisfaction of two preconditions: (1) the existence of
an "armed attack" and (2) a response proportionate to that
attack.76

1. Armed Attack
The United States asserted no credible claim of an actual,
physical armed attack on allied forces in South Viet N am. The
right of collective self-defense is the right of the state which
bas been the victim of an armed attack, not of a. would-be
protector. Even assuming that the threat of an armed attack
would qualify as an armed attack under article 51, the military
activities of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia merely raised
72 United Sta~ Notification to the United Nations Sec:urity Council of Selfdefense Measures Taken by the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam
Armed Forces, UN. Doc. S/9781 (1970) [hereinafter Yost Letter]. See Documentary Supplement infra.
73 Id. at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
74 Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565.
75 UN. Charter art. 51. See Documentary Supplement infra.
76 Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the"Vret Nam War,
75 Yale L.J. 1122, 1135-36, 1143 (1966).
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the possibility of an attack. But this possibility was so remote
in time as to fall outside the meaning of a "threat of armed
attack."
Traditionally, the use of armed force against another nation
in self-defense has been restricted. For example, the Caroline,
an American vessel used for supplies and communication in a
Canadian insurrection, was boarded in an American port at
midnight by an armed group acting under the orders of a
British officer. The boarding party set the vessel afire and let it
drift over Niagara Falls. The United States protest resulted in an
apology by Lord Ashburton, the British Special Commissioner
to the United States. In a note of reply of August 6, 1842,
Secretary of State Webster stated the limited circumstances in
which self-defense may be used:
[R]espect for the inviolable character of the territory of independent states is the most essential foundation of civilization ..••
Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted that exceptions
growing out of the great law of self-defense do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the "necessity of that
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation.m 7

When the United Nations Charter was originally drafted,
an armed attack was generally understood as an action through
which a state sought the initiative by the violent exercise of
physical power.78 Since then, some have argued for an expanded
concept which would include a military process rather than
a single, hostile, offensive event.79 The Department of State's
1966 Memorandum espoused this broadened concept. Specifically, the Memorandum argued that the concept of an armed
attack includes the processes of externally supported subversion,
clandestine provision of arms, infiltration of armed personnel,
and introduction of regular units of the North Vietnamese Army
into South Viet Nam.80
The Department of State's broad description of armed
attack fails to fall within Secretary Webster's more restricted
definition. Many modern treaty instruments of the United States
define an armed attack in a limited way which resembles
11 2 J. Moore, A Digest of International Law § 217, at 412 (1906). See also
R. Hull & T. Novogrod, Law and Vietnam 139-47 (1968).
78 Alford, The Legality of American Military Involvement in Viet Nam: A
Broader Perspective, 75 Yale L.J. 1109, 1114 (1966).
79 Id. at 1113.
so Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565.
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Webster's definition and not that of the Department of State.81
For example, Article 25 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States82 differentiates unequivocally between an armed
attack and other forms of aggression. This distinction is also found
in Articles 3 and 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance of 1947,83 in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,84
and in the United States-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security of 1960.8G In each treaty, measures of collective selfdefense taken against an armed attack are justified under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter.
Even more revealing is Article 2 of the SEATO Treaty,86
which specifically distinguishes between armed attack and "subversive activities directed from without." Article 4(1) authorizes
unilateral action in response to "aggression by means of armed
attack" and requires an immediate report of the action to the
Security Council of the United Nations. Moreover, article 4(2)
provides for consultation in case of threats "in any way other
than by armed attack" or "by any other fact or situation which
might endanger the peace of the area." (Emphasis added.)
The United States clearly sought to conform Article 4(1) of
SEATO to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to allow
unilateral use of armed force only in case of an armed attack,87
and article 51 has always been understood to embody a narrow
construction of armed attack.88 Thus, United States incursions
into Cambodia could only be justified under article 51 if they
were in response to an armed attack emanating from Cambodia.
President Nbmn described the alleged threat from within
Cambodia in his televised address to the Nation on April 30,
1970, as follows:
North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense
of respecting the sovereignty or neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands
81 Armed attack is also the controlling term in the Warsaw Treaty which
established the Warsaw Pact. See 219 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Oct. 10, 1955).
82 Apr. 30, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3
(effective Dec. 3, 1951).
83 Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, TJ.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77
(effective Dec. 3, 1948).
84 Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, TJ.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
(effective Aug. 24, 1949).
85 Jan. 19, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 4509, 372 U.N.T.S. 267
(effective Aug. 12, 1960).
sa SEATO Treaty art. 2. See note 47 supra.
87 Hearing on Executive K Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1954).
88 Lawyers Comm. on American Policy Towards Viet Nam, Vietnam and
International Law 27 (1967) [hereinafter Lawyers Comm.].
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of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries;
they are encircling the capital of Phnom Penh. Coming from
these sanctuaries, as you see here, they have moved into Cambodia
and are encircling the capital.
[I] f this enenty effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a
vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South
Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier-a refuge where enemy troops
could return from combat without fear of retaliation.89

Apparently, the attack to which the President referred was
the increasingly intensive strife between Cambodian and North
Vietnamese forces. The joint United States-South Vietnamese
response involved an attempt to prevent a defeat of the Government in Phnom Penh. Indeed, the President confirmed this view
in a later portion of his speech: "[T]he aid we will provide will
be limited for the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its
neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.mo
Ambassador Yost's letter to the President of the Security
Council referred to base areas maintained for five years by the
North Vietnamese in Cambodia for purposes of conducting military operations against South Viet Nam.91 The letter identified
the developments which triggered United States' action as the
expansion by the North Vietnamese of the perimeters of their
base areas, the expulsion of any remaining Cambodian presence
in those areas, the linking of the base areas into a continuous
chain along the South Vietnamese border, and the extension of
the bases deeper into Cambodian territory.92 The letter asserted
that North Vietnamese forces were massing in those areas in
preparation for attacks against South Viet Nam.93
Both President Nixon's address and the Yost letter displayed concern over the enlargement and extension of military
staging areas in Cambodia. Certainly the use of all of Cambodia
as a base of operations against South Viet N am would increase
the strength and flexibility of North Vietnamese operations.
However, it strains both language and credibility to consider
the enlargement of a base of operations as an armed attack.
One might properly characterize North Vietnamese activity in
Cambodia as an effort to facilitate the threat of an armed attack.
89 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 2 (emphasis added). See Documentary
Supplement infra.
90 Id. at col. 3 (emphasis added).
91 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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But this threat was sufficiently distant in time as to render
meaningless any attempt to equate the threat of armed attack
with an "armed attack" as defined under article 51. The latent
threat of hostile action launched from a neighboring state has
not traditionally justified resort to armed force in preemptive
self-defense.94 For instance, in the Nuremberg trial of war
criminals the court dealt with the defense "that Germany was
compelled to attack Norway to forestall an allied invasion and
her action was therefore preventive.m5 The tribunal said:
[I]t must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhelming
necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no
moment of deliberation." •. • From all this [evidence as to German
belief regarding an allied attack on Norway] it is clear that when
the plans for an attack on Norway were being made they were not
made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent allied landing,
but, at the most, that they might prevent an allied occupation at
some future date. . . . In the light of all the available evidence
it is impossible to accept the contention that the invasions of
Denmark and Norway were defensive and in the opinion of the
Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war. 96

Thus, even if the threat of an armed attack qualifies as
an armed attack, that threat must be imminent. But President
Ni."'i:on, in response to a reporter's question at the President's
press conference, indicated that the Administration considered
that the threat might not materialize for at least one year.97
Therefore, the United States crossed an international boundary
and employed armed force in response to a threat which was by
04 Lawyers Comm., supra note 88 1 at 1.
Ou Quoted in C. Bishop, International Law 778-79 (1962).

oa Id. (emphasis added).
07 Q. On April 20, you said Vietnamization was going so well that you could
pull 150,000 American troops out of Vietnam. Then you turned around
only 10 days later and said that Vietnamization was so badly threatened
you were sending troops into Cambodia. Would you explain this apparent
contradiction for us?
A. Well, I explained it in my speech of April 20, as you will recall, because
then I said that Vietnamization was going so well that we could bring
150,000 out by the spring of next year, regardless of the progress in the
Paris talks and the other criteria that I had mentioned.
But I also had warned at that time that increased enemy action in
Laos, in Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam was something that we had
noted and that if I had indicated and if I found that that i1zcreased
e11emy action would jeopardize the remaining forces who would be in
Viet11am, I would take stro1tg actio1t to deal with it.
I foUIId that the action that the enemy had taken in Cambodia would
leave the 240,000 Americans who would be there a year from now without
many combat troops to help defend them would leave them in an tmtenable
position. That's why I had to act.
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1970, at 8, col. 1 (emphasis added).
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no means imminent. Attempting to justify preemptive actions
exclusively in terms of such a distant threat does violence to
the clear meaning of article 51. Furthermore, such an overly
broad definition of an armed attack eliminates the distinction
between the concepts of armed attack and self-defense. A defensive measure which anticipates an attack by one year can itself
be interpreted as an armed attack necessitating self-defensive
measures.98 To allow self-defense in circumstances which legally
entitle the aggressor in turn to respond in self-defense is to
destroy the purpose of the United Nations Charter, i.e., to limit
the use of self-defense only to a response to an immediate
threat.99
As previously stated, the assertion of a claim of collective
self-defense is the right of the victim state, not of the would-be
protector.10° Collective self-defense involves the right of a nation
to request assistance in its defense. It differs fundamentally from
any contention that third-party nations have a discretionary
right to intervene by force in conflicts between other countries.101
Thus, even if the North Vietnamese launched some sort of armed
attack, the question of determining the victim of such an attack
would remain. The North Vietnamese activity, according to the
United States' argument, constituted an armed attack because
such activity involved the enlarging of staging and supply areas
within Cambodia, troop movement in the direction of Phnom
Penh but within Cambodia, and the possibility of an eventual
threat by North Vietnamese forces within Cambodia to remaining United States units in South Viet Nam. 102 On these facts it
is clear that the asserted thrusts of North Vietnamese main force
units were directed against Cambodia. Cambodia, therefore, was
the victim of an armed attack.
The victim of an armed attack may invoke the justification
of self-defense under the United Nations Charter.103 There is
no indication, however, that Cambodia asserted a claim of selfdefense. Even if Cambodia had asserted such a claim, the United
States could not legally have joined in an action of collective
self-defense. Under the Charter the right of self-defense does
not extend to a state which seeks to associate itself in the
Falk, supra note 76, at 1136.
For the legal justification of the right of self-defense in the U.N. Charter
see L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, Charter of the United Nations 244-48
(1969).
100 D. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 216-18 (1958).
101 Lawyers Co=., supra note 88, at 33.
102 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
103 U.N. Charter art. 51. See Documentary Supplement infra.
98
99
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defense of a state acting in self-defense.104 However, the United
States did not invoke the doctrine of collective self-defense in
conjunction with Cambodia, but in conjunction with South Viet
Nam. 105 The latter was not in this instance a victim of any
armed attack, the tenuous justification in the Yost letter notwithstanding. In addition, any assertion that South Viet N am has
been the victim of an armed attack from Cambodia for a
five-year period cannot be sustained. The fact that such hostilities
could continue over five years without requiring measures of
self-defense indicates that these hostilities did not create a need
for self-defense which was instant.

2. Proportionality
The second precondition necessary for the justification of
the use of armed force in self-defense under article 51 is that
the response must be proportionate to the attack.106 A disproportionate response will transform an otherwise justifiable exercise of the right of self-defense into an act of aggression.107
Ambassador Yost's letter stated that "North Vietnam has
stepped up guerrilla actions into South Vietnam and is concentrating its main forces in these base areas in preparation for
further massive attacks into South Vietnam.mos This factual
assertion is not reflected in President Ni.'l:on's address of April 30
or his subsequent press conference of May 9. The President indicated that he was responding to the threat which would exist
to United States forces following another withdrawal of 150,000
men should North Vietnamese forces succeed in consolidating
their position in Cambodia through the overthrow of the Government of Premier Lon Nol or by a severe limitation of its
power.100 Without dwelling on this crucial discrepancy, one
cannot seriously say that the incursion into Cambodia of at least
50,000 allied troops on six fronts with accompanying air support,110 a flotilla of 140 gunboats111 and a one-hundred mile
allied blockade of the Cambodian coastline112 was a proportionLawyers Comm., supra note 88, at 33.
Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
Falk, supra note 76, at 1143.
Because art. 51 is an e:..:ception to the general rule that use of armed force
·without prior consultation with the United Nations is illegitimate, any use of
armed force which does not fall within this exception is aggressive.
lOB Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
109 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 3.
110 N.Y. Times, May 10, 1970, § 4, at 3, col 1.
111 N.Y. Times, May 12, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
112 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1970, at 1, col 4.
10-1
lOIS
106
107
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ate response of self-defense to "stepped up guerrilla actions,m 13
the only alleged new military action emanating from Cambodia.
against South VietNam.

B. The Neutrality of Cambodia
As President Nixon affirmed in his address of April30, 1970,
the United States has acknowledged Cambodian neutrality.m
Respect for that neutrality was previously assured by a diplomatic note during the Johnson administration115 and was reiterated on numerous occasions by repeated demands that North
Viet Nam respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of
Cambodia.116
Generally, a neutral state must remain impartial toward
belligerents and a belligerent state must respect the neutral's
impartiality.117 A belligerent must also respect the territorial
integrity of the neutral state. On the other band, a neutral state
is obligated to prevent the use of its territory for the launching
of attacks by one belligerent upon another.U8 A neutral state has
the further duty to protest such violations. Failure to do so would
offend its duty to maintain impartiality.119 However, the breach
of its neutrality by either a belligerent state or the neutral state
itself does not terminate neutral status.120 Only a declaration of
war or hostilities amounting to acts of war by one of the belligerents against the neutral will have that effect.121
The Administration has argued that North Vietnamese
forces have violated the territorial integrity of Cambodia by
utilizing Cambodia as a base for military operations against
South Viet N am.122 These actions certainly did constitute a breach
by North Viet N am of Cambodian neutrality. But they have not
terminated Cambodia's neutral status. Indeed, it bas been the
announced, albeit unsuccessful, policy of the Cambodian Gov113 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
114 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 1.
115 United States Note to the Kingdom of Cambodia (Dec. 4, 1967), cited in
58 Dep't State Bull. 124 (1968).
116 The most recent United States affirmation of Cambodian neutrality was
made in an address by the Secretary of State entitled "Two Aspects of the
Search for Peace." Address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Cornell
Alumni Ass'n, Apr. 18, 1970. See Dep't State Publication 8525, Gen'l Foreign
Policy Ser. 243 (May 1970).
117 2 L. Oppenheim, International Law 673-74 (7th ed. 1948).
118 Id. at 704.
119 Id. at 675.
120 Id. at 752.
121 Id. at 753.
122 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra.
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ernment to keep its territory free of armed Viet Cong troops.12:.l
Hence, under traditional principles of international law the movement of American forces into Cambodia is itself a violation of
that state's neutrality unless some further justification can be
shown.
The argument that Cambodia ratified the American action
after it had taken place is not persuasive. In fact, two members
of the Cambodian Government made an initial protest.124 Clearly,
the joint United States-South Vietnamese incursion constituted
a fundamental breach of Cambodian neutrality and could not
later be legally justified by Cambodian acquiescence, particularly
since the Cambodian Government had little choice but to
acquiesce.125 Nor does the argument that the areas subjected to
invasion were no longer under the effective political control of
Cambodia justify the incursion. Political and military considerations do not diminish the right of the Government of Cambodia
to maintain its territorial integrity and neutrality. Otherwise, one
could argue that South VietNam could claim no rights over Viet
Cong-held portions of its own territory. Finally, the argument
that Cambodia's failure to repel the North Vietnamese presence
justified the United States incursions into this neutral country
must fail in view of the United States' treaty obligation under
Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter to first of all seek
a solution of disputes, other than an armed attack, by peaceful
means.
C. Rights and Obligations Under SEATO
The Administration did not attempt to justify its policy
under the SEATO Treaty. The reluctance to invoke the SEATO
Treaty commitment is understandable since the Cambodian incur~
sion was in violation of that treaty. The SEATO Treaty obligates
the signatories to uphold the United Nations Charter.126 Since
United States actions in Cambodia are violative of the Charter,127
they therefore violate the SEATO Treaty as well. There are four
additional reasons why the United States incursions into Cambodia violated the SEATO Treaty. First, the treaty speaks of
meeting "the common danger in accordance with its [each counN.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1967, at 17, col. 4.
See statement of Foreign Minister, Yem Sambour, Time, May 11, 1970,
at 13, col. 3; statement of Information Minister, Trinh Hoanh, N.Y. Times, May
2, 1970, at 4, col. 4.
125 The Cambodians could hardly afford to protest the United States' incursion as they already found themselves on the defensive.
126 SEATO Treaty art. 1. See note 47 supra.
127 See Part Two, IA supra.
123
124
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try's] constitutional processes.m28 The incursion into Cambodia
is per se invalid under the treaty because under the United
States Constitution such a decision must be made by Congress.129
Second, articles 4(1) and 4(2) establish a distinction between
an armed attack and "subversive activities directed from outside." As pointed out above, there occurred no armed attack to
which the United States could respond. As the late Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles cautioned, the treaty language does
not support the contention that "any country which feels it
is being threatened by subversive activities in another country
is free to use armed force against that country.mso Third, the
SEATO Treaty was further violated by the United States because
it expressly requires that all the parties consult before taking
any action to meet the common danger posed by such outside
subversion.131 The United States made no effort to consult with
the SEATO allies prior to taking action in Cambodia. Finally,
the failure to obtain Cambodian consent or act in response to a
Cambodian invitation resulted in a direct, unequivocal violation
of SEATO's Article 4(3) because Cambodia was designated a
state within the scope of Article 4 by the September 1954 Protocol
to the SEATO Treaty.132

D. The Position Taken by the United States in Analogous
Situations
The action taken by the United States in Cambodia is inconsistent with positions propounded by the United States in the
past. When confronted with similar types of action initiated by
other nations, United States spokesmen in the United Nations
have consistently condemned unilateral attacks directed across
national borders in pursuit of foreign troops using foreign soil
as sanctuaries.
1. Tunisia
For example, in 1957 French forces operating in Algeria
attacked Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in Tunisia, which was then being
used as a sanctuary and staging area by Algerian revolutionary
SEATO Treaty art. 4(1). See note 47 supra.
See Part One supra.
Statement of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Hearings on the
President's Proposal on the Middle East Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1957).
131 SEATO Treaty art. 4(2). See note 47 supra.
132 Protocol to the SEATO Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 87, T.I.A.S.
No. 36 (effective Feb. 19, 1955).
128
129
130
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forces. The United States publicly expressed concern about the
incident and the Department of State summoned the French
Ambassador to explain the French action.133 The official French
explanation markedly paralleled the stated United States objective in Cambodia: to destroy enemy sanctuaries as well as staging and supply bases used by guerrilla forces for raids into
Algeria.
2. Yemen
In 1964 Ambassador Stevenson, speaking in the Security
Council, condemned a British bombing attack on Habir in Yemen
which was undertaken in response to Yemeni attacks against the
British Protectorate of Aden.134
3. };fiddle East

During the course of the present conflict in the Middle East,
the United States has repeatedly expressed negative reactions
ranging from concern to condemnation of Israeli attacks upon
Arab guerrilla sanctuaries in Arab countries.13u The Israeli raids
were designed to accomplish the dual objectives of reprisal and
destruction of guerrilla sanctuaries and staging bases. The American incursion into Cambodia does not materially differ from
these invasions, which were all condemned by the United States.
Consequently, the Cambodian affair invites cynicism toward subsequent United States' efforts to encourage respect for law in the
conduct of international affairs. Finally, the allied incursions
into Cambodia also compound the prolonged violation of international law by the massive military presence of the United
States in VietNam.
II
VIETNAM

A. Collective Self-Defense Under the United Nations Charter
The Department of State Memorandum justified United
States action in VietNam as collective self-defense in response
to an armed attack.136 But the concept of armed attack under
Article 51 of the Charter should be construed narrowly to restrict
the right of self-defense to instances "when the necessity for
38 Dep't State Bull. 333 (1958).
19 U.N. SCOR, llOSth meeting 67 (1964).
62 Dep't State Bull. 226 (1970); 60 Dep't State Bull. 340 (1969); U.N.
Doc. S/RES/248 (1968); 58 Dep't State Bull. 509 (1968).
136 Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565-85.
183
134
135

HeinOnline -- 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 719 1970

Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

720

[Vol. 45:695

action" is "instant, overwhelming and leaves no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberations.m37
Long-smoldering conditions of unrest, subversion and infiltration existed for ten years prior to American involvement
in South Viet Nam. Before 1965, according to the Mansfield
Report, infiltration from North Viet Nam "was confined primarily to political leaders and military leadership." But by 1962
"United States Military Advisors and service forces in South
Viet Nam totaled approximately 10,000 men.mas Apparently,
Department of Defense figures indicate that there were only 400
North Vietnamese troops in South VietNam in March 1965.139
Large numbers of North Vietnamese troops infiltrated into South
Viet Nam only after the United States intervened in 1965 to
prevent the collapse of the Saigon Government:
U.S. combat troops in strength arrived at that point in response
to the appeal of the Saigon authorities. The Vietcong counterresponse was to increase their military activity with forces
strengthened by intensified local recruitment and infiltration of
regular North Vietnamese troops. With the change in the composition of opposing forces, the character of the war also changed
sharply.14o

In view of the narrow definition of armed attack, the subversion
in South Viet Nam before 1965 could not justify measures of
collective self-defense under the Charter and could not allow
attacks against North VietNam.
The Viet Cong guerrilla attacks on Pleiku on February 7,
1965, marked the beginning of active United States war actions
in South VietNam and the extension of those actions into North
Viet N am. However, no attempt was made to describe such war
actions as collective self-defense. They were officially explained
as reprisals. Labelling as provocations the attacks near Pleiku,
in which seven Americans were killed and 109 wounded, President Johnson announced that "retaliatory [air] attacks against
barracks and staging areas ... in North Vietnam [were] today
[launched] in response to [these] provocations ordered and
directed by the Hanoi regime. 11141
But reprisals involving the use of armed force violate the
137

Moore, supra note 77, § 217, at 412; see text accompanying notes 77-88

supra.
138 The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow, Report Submitted
to the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations 2 (Jan. 6, 1966) [hereinafter Mansfield
Report].
130 Schlesinger, Vietnam and the 1968 Elections, 113 Cong. Rec. S14454 (daily
ed. Oct. 9, 1967).
140 Mansfield Report, supra note 138, at 1.
141 52 Dep't State Bull. 238 (1965).
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United Nations Charter.142 The Security Council condemnation
of British raids against Yemen in April 1964 in reprisal for
Yemeni attacks against the British Protectorate of Aden exemplified the United Nations position. Moreover, Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson emphasized that the United States disapproved of
"retaliatory raids, wherever they occur and by whomever they
are committed.m43
Under the United Nations Charter the United States reprisals were illegal in two other respects. First, they were not
directed against insurgent forces in South VietNam, which staged
the attack on Pleiku, but against North VietNam. Second, the
massive bombing raids were totally disproportionate to the original attacks to which they supposedly responded. The air raids
vastly exceeded the force or destruction of the attacks near
Pleiku and resulted in the escalation of the previous conflict
into a war against North VietNam.
The International Control Commission rejected the arguments promulgated in justification of the American reprisals. On
February 13, 1965, an ICC Special Report written by the IndianPolish majority advised the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference that United States military actions against the North on
February 7 and February 8, 1965, "indicated violations of the
Ge11eva Agreement.m44
B. Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter

Article 33 ( 1) provides that "parties to any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security," must first seek a solution by
peaceful means of their own choice. Yet the United States did
not seek a peaceful solution to the growing conflict in Indochina
through the world body prior to using armed force. By 1954
the United States had given aid to South Viet Nam and had
operated a Military Assistance Command there since February
1962. The United States has alleged that infiltration of troops
from the North to the South has continued since at least 1959.14u
142 U.N. Doc. A/16799 (XXII) (Sept. 26, 1967) ; U.N. Doc. S/RES/5650
(1961) (United States and United Kingdom abstaining).
143 19 U.N. SCOR, ll08th meeting 67 (1964).
144 Special Report, June 2, 1962, para. 20, Hearings on Supplemental Foreign
Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966-Vietnam Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 742 {1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings]. The
Geneva Accords of 1954 art. 7 provide that "[n]o person, military or civilian, shall
be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the
the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized
to enter by the Joint Commission."
14u Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565.

HeinOnline -- 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 721 1970

Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Law Review

722

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

£Vol. 45:695

Nevertheless, the first American report to the Council was submitted only in 1964; 146 the United States did not submit the
question of the Viet N am dispute to the Security Council until
January 31, 1966,147 approximately one year after the commencement of the bombing of the North.
Potential means for a peaceful settlement included General
de Gaulle's proposal in 1963 of a neutral Viet N am,148 a subsequent French call in 1964 to reconvene the Geneva Conference
on Laos/49 and a suggestion by Secretary-General U Thant in
1964 that a secret meeting between representatives of North
VietNam and the United States be arranged in Burma.u•o The
United States rejected each of these alternatives over the threeyear intervening period between General Maxwell Taylor's
Report of November 1961, which dealt with the possible contingency of taking defensive measures directly against the
North151 and the initiation of the bombing raids in 1965. During
that period the United States must have contemplated the
increased use of armed force against North Viet Nam. The
failure to resort to the United Nations is therefore inexcusable.

C. Duties and Rights Under SEATO
SEATO provisions do not allow the United States to commit
troops to South VietNam under the circumstances. Under Articles 1 and 6 of SEATO, any action in violation of the United
Nations Charter cannot be justified under SEATO since those
articles pledge the signatories' respect and support for the
Charter. Although the Department of State's Memorandum
speaks of the "obligation ... to meet the common danger in the
event of armed aggression" under article 4(1), the precise wording of the treaty language in article 4 ( 1) is "aggression by
means of armed attack." Armed attack is narrower than armed
aggression. As already discussed, North Vietnamese activities in
South VietNam cannot be construed as an armed attack under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.152 That the activities
did not constitute an armed attack under SEATO is apparent
from article 2 :
146 Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating
to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 132-35 (1965).
147 Id. at 271-73.
148 Id. at 14.
149 Id. at 16.
150 Staff of Senate Republican Policy Comm., The War in Vietnam, 113 Cong.
Rec. 5242, 5250 (daily ed. May 9, 1967).
151 The Vietnam Hearings 171-72 (Vintage ed. 1966).
152 See text accompanying notes 136-143 supra.
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In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty,
the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to
prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without
agai1ZSt their territorial integrity and political stability. [Emphasis
added.]

Thus, under article 4(2), unless an armed attack has
occurred, the parties must "consult immediately in order to agree
on the measures which should be taken for the common defense."
The Communique of the SEATO meeting, dated April 15, 1964,
did not indicate a finding of an armed attack against South
VietNam. It merely cautioned that members of SEATO should
remain prepared to take further steps in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty.153 The United States has never obtained
collective consent from SEATO members for its combat actions
in Viet Nam. Consequently, the United States acted and continues to act in violation of SEATO's prohibition of unilateral
military action except in case of an armed attack. If SEATO
had approved United States' military operations in Viet Nam,
such action would still have had to be authorized by the Security
Council under Article 53 of the United Nations Charter as an
enforcement action by a regional arrangement. In conclusion, the
American violations of SEATO and the United Nations Charter
completely undermine the argument that the United States must
act in VietNam to demonstrate to other nations that the United
States maintains its treaty commitments.
D. The Geneva Accords of 1954
The increase in hostilities since 1954 is obvious evidence of
the fact that all the parties to the Viet N am conflict have violated
the Accords. But in its Memorandum the Department of State
argued that South Viet N am's violations of the Accords were
justified by prior violations by North Viet Nam and relied on
the principle that "a material breach of an agreement by one
party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an
equivalent, corresponding, or related provision until the defaulting party is prepared to honor its obligations.m54
At the outset it is necessary to indicate that both the United
States and South Viet Nam are bound by the 1954 Geneva
Accords. In Article 2 of the Treaty of Viet N am Independence
of June 4, 1954,11m VietNam agreed to accept France's obliga153
154
155

50 Dep't State Bull. 692 (1964).
Memorandum, supra note 18, at 577.
161 British and Foreign State Papers 649 (1963).
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tions with respect to VietNam. France was a signatory of the
1954 Geneva Accords and orally agreed to the Final Declaration.166 The United States is bound by the 1954 Accords as a "successor" to France. Under Article 27 of the Accords, signatories
and their successors are responsible for ensuring the observance
and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof.

1. Election Provisions 167
In justifying South Viet Nam's refusal to implement the
election provision of the 1954 Geneva Accords, the Department
of State declared that "the South Vietnamese Government's failure to engage in consultations in 1955, with a view to holding
elections in 1956, involved no breach of obligation. The conditions in North Viet N am during that period were such as to make
impossible any free and meaningful expression of popular will.mr;s
But the alleged repression of the popular will in either North
or South VietNam could not, under the Accords, entitle either
regime to refuse to plan and consult about the elections for unification. Between July 1955 and July 1956 the two regimes were
obligated to consult in order to determine the framework for the
elections although South Viet N am was free to demand whatever
safeguards it considered necessary for proper elections.m To the
extent that the United States, as a successor to France, encouraged the Saigon government to avoid consultation, it breached
its duty under Article 2 7 of the Accords to ensure the observance
of its provisions.
2. Articles 16 and 17160

The Department of State Memorandum also contended that
intensified Communist aggression in late 1961 justified a substantial increase in the number of military personnel and types
166 Under international law oral agreements are binding. H. Briggs, The Law
of Nations 838 (2d ed. 1952).
157 Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954, para. 7, Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia
and Vietnam, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 58 (1965) [hereinafter Final Declaration].
158 Memorandum, supra note 18, at 578.
159 Final Declaration, supra note 157.
160 Geneva Accords arts. 16 & 17 provide in part: art. 16: "With effect from
the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into
Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited." ••• ; art. 17 (a): "With effect from the date of entry into force of the
present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the
form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat
aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons, and
armored vehicles, is prohibited."
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of equipment introduced into South Viet Nam. But the International Control Commission, in a Special Report prepared
by the Indian-Polish majority, specifically rejected the claim
that increased aid was permissible for South Vietnamese selfdefense. The Report concluded:
[T]he Republic of Vietnam has violated Articles 16 and 17 of the
Geneva Agreement in receiving the increased military aid •••
[and] the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory
Command in South Vietnam, as well as the introduction of a large
number of U.S. military personnel . , . amounts to a factual
military alliance, which is prohibited under Article 19 of the
Geneva Agreement. 1G1

m
THE PROSPECT OF CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT
A fundamental violation of the United Nations Charter is
particularly grievous when committed by such an immensely
powerful and influential supporter of the United Nations as the
United States. But should the United States succeed in legitimizing its position by claiming that measures of self-defense were
justified in response to questionably documented armed attacks,
the damage to the United Nations would be irreparable. The
acceptance of a broad definition of armed attack would render
virtually meaningless those provisions of the United Nations
Charter which provide machinery for anticipatory conflict resolution. Conditions favorable to justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law
could not be maintained. The determination, stated in the Preamble, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"
would become an empty hope.

CONCLUSION
The United States today faces a grave crisis. Never before
in our history has the nation been so fundamentally divided over
issues of foreign policy. More important, growing numbers of our
citizens believe themselves frustrated in all efforts to change the
course of policies they regard as unwise or immoral. The situation, if allowed to worsen, could have grave consequences for the
future viability of our democracy.
The debate over the nation's course in Southeast Asia reflects
more than a mere disagreement with foreign policy. It indicates
a dangerous shift in the balance of power within our constitutional
161

1966 Hearings, supra note 144, at 740.
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system. It is thus imperative, as never before, that the Congress
vigorously reassert its responsibilities as the only branch of government constitutionally empowered to decide issues of war and
peace. It is incumbent upon each member of Congress, whether
he opposes or defends the present policy in Southeast Asia, to
consider seriously the consequences of congressional inaction.
We have witnessed in the atomic age a continual exacerbation of the tensions which tend to divide the world community.
When coupled with the exponential increase in the magnitude of
man's destructive capabilities, this process invites disaster. Therefore, actions by the world's most powerful nation which either
violate or ignore the basic tenets of international law, as embodied in the United Nations Charter, constitute culpable irresponsibility. We are painfully aware that in this regard the
United States does not stand alone. But historically the United
States has represented itself as a moral force in the world and
has repeatedly affirmed its faith in the rule of law. Quite simply,
United States actions should conform to that rhetoric. Respect
for the United Nations Charter and use of machinery for conflict
resolution which exists under it must comprise the keystone of
American foreign policy. Ultimately, our security in the world
depends as much upon the foregoing considerations as upon the
wise exercise of armed power.
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